Well, according to Whitehead.
I suspect that there’s a great deal of truth to this claim. After all, the questions that plague man’s mind haven’t really changed. We still wonder about the nature of reality, and the nature of the physical world, or about our own psychology. We still squabble about public ethics, or political affairs, about the possibility of God, and all of the concerns of religion. We may gloat about thetriumph of technology, of the medical wonders of modern man, but we continue to ponder the same questions about life, death, and everything in between, that Plato dared to ask.
Thus begins the 49th philosophers’ carnival.
On the Euthyphro
As with so much of the discussion of Plato, we begin with the Euthyphro.
Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?
Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.
Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. [10a] The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Richard Brown of Philosophy Sucks! examines the question of the necessity of God in morality in Reason and the Nature of Obligation, beginning with the claim that, “The view that if God did not exist then all things would be permissible is familiar and quite common, and just about as wrongheaded as a view can be.”
On the Republic
Many a freshman philosophy course has taken great pleasure in butchering the magnum opus, particularly that one passage we all know so well. As Schopenhauer wrote in the World as Will and Representation:
This world that appears to the senses has no true being, but only a ceaseless becoming; it is, and it also is not; and its comprehension is not so much a knowledge as an illusion. This is what he expresses in a myth at the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, the most important passage in all his works … . He says that men, firmly chained in a dark cave, see neither the genuine original light nor actual things, but only the inadequate light of the fire in the cave, and the shadows of actual things passing by the fire behind their backs. Yet they imagine that the shadows are the reality, and that determining the succession of these shadows is true wisdom.
So with great joy I give you Brian Berkey’s Is the Opacity of the Nature of Social Reality a Bad Thing? posted at Philosophy from the Left Coast. He comments on his submission:
In this post I examine some of the similarities between Marx and Searle’s accounts of the nature of social reality, and ask whether the fact, acknowledged by both but lamented only by Marx, that much of the nature of social reality does not appear to us in our everyday lives as it really is, is cause for regret. I claim that it is, in part because the opacity of the nature of social reality entails that we are lacking a certain kind of knowledge, and that more knowledge is always a good thing.
On the Gorgias
Are you happy? Really?
Socrates But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,-more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.
Polus You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.
Socrates I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us-are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
Polus Exactly so.
The whole intent of the Gorgias is to demonstrate that acting justly is tantamount to a good life (as is the case with much of Plato). But the case of the tyrant seems to be an interesting counter-example. After all, tyrants do as they please, without regard for the just character of actions, and seem to be no less better off as a result. With the Socratic elenchus in full swing, Plato describes a positively stunning rebuttal that is, perhaps, one of the most excellent examples of argument in the history of philosophy.
But the conclusion of this rebuttal brings up an interesting question: to what degree is reflective thought relevant to the actualization of happiness? That is to say that, whether or not you think you are happy appears to be, at the very least, relevant to whether or not you actually are. The whole notion of consciousness is, at this point, wide open for exploration.
That brings us, in what is quite possibly the most roundabout transition ever, to Richard Brown’s second piece in this carnival, on Two Concepts of Transitive Consciousness, “But it is natural to think that some kinds of states are more normally conscious than others. For instance it is natural to think that the sensory sates and other kinds of states that we most likely share with other animals, do normally cause higher-order states about them.”
On the Crito
The laws of the state: should we follow them?
“Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.”
Errol Lord Pamela Stubbart presents an intriguing look at Drunk Driving and Mens Rea posted at The Excluded Middle. Does the driver bear reponsibility for his actions, given their impaired state?
Take now someone who has had fifteen or more drinks. She is barely coordinated enough to turn the key, and yet manages to drive home without any recollection of the trip. How can this driver’s mind be considered “guilty” in any way when it was physiologically stripped of its capacity for reason and was essentially performing only autonomic functions? Ironically, the more one has had to drink, the less responsible she becomes for her actions.
On the Apology
Is living well better than simply living? Is being just better than just being?
Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know this of a truth - that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason also, I am not angry with my accusers, or my condemners; they have done me no harm, although neither of them meant to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.
Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, - then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.
The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways - I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.
Richard presents Moral Asymmetries of Existence posted at Philosophy, et cetera, saying, “David Benatar argues from the asymmetry principle (starting good lives is permissible, but not starting bad lives is required) to the conclusion that it is better never to have existed. My post shows how we can reject his argument by exposing the contingent nature of the asymmetry principle.”
On the Timaeus
As seems to be the case with all great philosophy, the Timaeus is utterly incomprehensible, shrouded with elusive imagery. What is clear, however, is Plato’s great concern with the nature of the universe, from the most basic particles of existence to the influence of the eternal realms:
And there is still a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world–the pattern of the unchangeable, or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes.
Such is the case with the piece submitted on behalf of Joseph Long on Florida Student Philosophy Blog titled God’s Existence and the Standard Model of Particle Physics: An Entailment Relation? Though obtrusive, Mr. Long deals with those self-same principles of the Timaeus: God and Particles.
Essentially, the premises are these: (i) for any x in nature, if x is an irreducibly complex mind, then x was created by an irreducibly complex mind; (ii) Some irreducibly complex minds are found in nature; (iii) causes precede their effects; (iv) the universe is finitely old. The implicit conclusion seems to be this: Since mini-ID theory, when conjoined with these independently supported premises, implies a supernatural conclusion and since supernatural conclusions cannot be empirically tested, mini-ID theory cannot be a scientific theory.
On Aristotle
Being the first footnote, he is the most prominent. Aristotle is, in this manner, the first step into the deep end.
And what better way to end, than with a laugh?
Thad Guy presents An Introduction to Modal Logic commenting on his submission, “Plato and Aristotle have contributed many things to the western world and specifically to philosophy. One of Aristotle’s more renowned contributions was that of modal logic. It has proven itself to be wonderful tool with many uses. In this comic I look at one use of modal logic, deceiving people. I hope that you enjoy it.”
—
Thus endeth the carnival:
They were his last words—he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.
Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.
Just for the record, I was the author of the “Drunk Driving and Mens Rea” post from The Excluded Middle
Yes, Pamela deserves all the credit for “Drunk Driving and Mens Rea.” I merely nominated it.
Edited to reflect this development. Sorry for the mixup.
The falacy of the logic expressed in “Drunk Driving…” lies in which act constitutes the irresponsible behavior. Granted that as one gets more intoxicated they loose ability to function and be “resopnsible” for their behavior, but the resposibility comes before the intoxication. Choosing to drink yourself into a state of irresponsibility is in fact irresponsible. If intoxication is required, then the responsible person makes plans for transportation home that is responsibly not intoxicated.
Roy,
Thanks for commenting. This point has made in numerous comments and it is of course true. There is no fallacy that you suggest, although perhaps a misunderstanding. My argument was merely that the irresponsible decision - drinking - is *necessarily* secondarily related the guilty act of driving, and that this complicates the issue even more so than in other cases of recklessness or culpable negligence.
Pam
Pam I think there is a huge falacy involved here and perpetuated in you gracious reply. Drinking can not be secondary to an act - driving - that follows. Neither drinking or driving by themselves represent a irresponsible act. It is the conbination of the two. If one knows (and it would be hard to be ignorant of the the fact in current society) that drinking impairs judgement and the ability to drive safely then the only resposible behavior is to take appropriate action prior to the act of drinking. In any scenario drinking is a primary action to susequent actions that become dangerous when done by the intoxiacted.
One is not guilty of driving, but of drunk driving. Drunk precedes driving here as it does in reality. Without drinking there is no guilt in driving on its own.
PS. The notion that deliberate deading of the mind in any way rids the person of guilt in an action would render all actions take while intoxicated unprosecutable. When sober the mind is able to know that an impaired state will occur and actions in that state will be their responsiblity to take proper precautions for or maybe not get drunk. It is not like the mind involuntarly is incapacitated or lost unkown or without culpability of the person.
Good luck